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Perceptual judgments can be made on the basis of different kinds of information: state-based 
access to specific details that differentiate two similar images, or strength-based assessments 
of relational match/mismatch. We explored state- and strength-based perception in eleven 
right-hemisphere stroke patients, and examined lesion overlap images to gain insight into the 
neural underpinnings of these different kinds of perceptual judgments. Patients and healthy 
controls were presented with pairs of scenes that were either identical or differed in that one 
scene was slightly expanded or contracted relative to the other. Same/different confidence 
judgments were used to plot receiver-operating characteristics and estimate the contributions 
of state- and strength-based perception. The patient group showed a significant and selective 
impairment of strength-based, but not state-based, perception. This finding was not an artifact 
of reduced levels of overall performance, because matching perceptual discriminability levels 
between controls and patients revealed a double dissociation, with higher state-based, and 
lower strength-based, perception in patients versus controls. We then conducted exploratory 
follow-up analyses on the patient group, based on the observation of substantial individual 
differences in state-based perception — differences that were masked in analyses based on the 
group mean. Patients who were relatively spared in state-based perception (but impaired in 
strength-based perception) had damage that was primarily in temporo-parietal cortical regions. 
Patients who were relatively impaired in both state- and strength-based perception had 
overlapping damage in the thalamus, putamen, and adjacent white matter. These patient 
groups were not different in any other measure, e.g., presence of spatial neglect symptoms, 
age, education, lesion volume, or time since stroke. These findings shed light on the different 
roles of right hemisphere regions in high-level perception, suggesting that the thalamus and 
basal ganglia play a critical role in state- and strength-based perception, whereas temporo-
parietal cortical regions are important for intact strength-based perception. 
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 Change detection can be based on state-based or strength-based signals 
 
 Examined neural underpinnings of state- and strength-based perception 
 
 Temporo-parietal lesions led to selective deficits in strength-based perception 
 
 Subcortical lesions led to both state- and strength-based deficits  
 








 How do we detect changes in the environment? Imagine you are shown two 
photographs of a park and asked whether they are exactly the same or if something about the 
park was different in the two images. In some cases, you may be able to detect a specific 
difference — for example, a water fountain that is in one picture but not the other. 
Alternatively, you may know that the pictures are different, but are unable to provide details 
about any specific change.  
 Thus, there are two kinds of information that can be used for perceptual change 
detection, which have been referred to as state-based and strength-based perception (Aly & 
Yonelinas, 2012; for related distinctions, see Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 2000; Rensink, 
2000, 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006; Howe & Webb, 2014). State- and strength-based perception 
have been studied by asking individuals to make same/different confidence judgments on pairs 
of images (e.g., pairs of scenes, faces, fractals, or objects; Aly & Yonelinas, 2012, Aly et al., 
2013, Aly et al., 2014). Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan 
& Creelman, 2005) analyses are then used to estimate the contributions of two kinds of 
perceptual decisions.  
 State-based perception is associated with high-confidence responses that are rarely in 
error; it is a discrete state that either occurs or does not, and when it does occur, it is associated 
with accurate awareness of specific details that differentiate two images. The probability of 
state-based perception is reflected in the upper x-intercept of ROCs (Figure 1). Strength-based 
perception, on the other hand, is associated with a wider range of confidence responses; it is a 
continuously-graded signal associated with a feeling that something has changed, with little to 
no ability to report what that change was. The discriminability afforded by strength-based 
perception is related to the curvilinearity of ROCs (Figure 1). 
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 In previous studies, we have found that these two kinds of perception can be doubly 
dissociated, have different temporal dynamics, and are associated with distinct kinds of 
conscious experiences (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012; Aly et al., 2013, 2014). For example, state-based 
perception makes a greater contribution to tasks involving detection of discrete object changes 
(e.g., a water fountain that is present in one scene but absent in another), is associated with a 
rapid temporal onset, and subjective experiences are those of consciously perceiving specific, 
detailed differences. In contrast, strength-based perception makes a greater contribution to 
tasks involving global or relational change detection (e.g., a subtle manipulation of the 
distances between component parts of a scene), is associated with a gradual temporal onset, 
and subjective experiences are those of feeling as if a change has occurred but being unable to 
pinpoint what that change was (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012; also see Fernandez-Duque & Thornton, 
2000; Rensink, 2000, 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006; Galpin et al., 2008; Busch et al., 2009; Busch 
et al., 2010; Howe & Webb, 2014; but see Simons et al., 2005). 
 Thus, previous behavioral work on state- and strength-based perception has shown 
that perceptual decisions can be made on the basis of functionally dissociable processes or 
representations. State- and strength-based perception may reflect differences at early- to mid-
level stages of perceptual representation (i.e., what information is represented in visual cortex, 
depending on the focus of attention) or later stages of decision-making (i.e., what information 
is used to inform the perceptual decision). While current data do not allow adjudication 
between these possibilities, it is clear that independent sources of information can be used to 
guide perceptual judgments.  
 In a previous neuropsychological study, we investigated the contribution of the 
hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal lobe (MTL) cortex to state- and strength-based 
perception (Aly et al., 2013). We tested patients with selective lesions to the hippocampus, 
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bilaterally, and patients with more extensive unilateral MTL lesions that included the 
hippocampus and surrounding cortex. On each trial, patients and healthy controls were 
presented with a pair of scenes that were either identical or differed in that one scene was 
expanded or contracted relative to the other (Figure 1A). These changes alter the relational or 
configural information within the scenes without adding or removing any specific objects. 
Participants made same/different confidence judgments using a 1-6 scale, and these 
confidence responses were used to plot ROCs (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). The ROCs were in turn used to estimate state- and strength-based perception (see 
Figure 1B for hypothetical data). The upper x-intercept of an ROC provides the probability that 
state-based perception has occurred, while the degree of curvilinearity is proportional to the 
contribution of strength-based perception (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012; see also Yonelinas, 1994).  
 Using this approach, we found that the patients were selectively impaired in strength-
based perception (graded judgments of the overall configural or relational match/mismatch 
between images) but showed intact state-based perception (related to the ability to identify 
specific detailed differences between scenes, Aly & Yonelinas, 2012). This was true for patients 
with selective hippocampal lesions as well as those with more extensive MTL lesions. These 
data suggested that the hippocampus is critical for detecting configural or relational 
match/mismatch between complex scenes, but is not needed for state-based judgments based 




Figure 1. Assessing state- and strength-based perception. Same/different judgments 
can be used to estimate the contributions of state- and strength-based perception. For 
example, participants could be shown pairs of scenes (A) that are either identical or 
different and asked to make same/different judgments using a confidence scale. In this 
example, the scenes are different: the image on the left is expanded outward while the 
image on the right is contracted inward. Same/different confidence ratings are 
subsequently used to plot receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs). A hypothetical 
ROC (B), depicting the pattern of results observed in variations of this task in prior 
studies, is shown here for illustration (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012, Aly et al., 2013, 2014). The 
left-most point on the ROC reflects the probability of a hit (“same” judgment when 
images are the same; y-axis) and a false alarm (“same” judgment when images are 
different; x-axis) for the most confident “same” response. Subsequent points reflect the 
cumulative hit and false alarm rates as confidence responses are added on, in order 
from highest-confidence “same” to highest-confidence “different”. The upper x-
intercept provides an estimate of the probability of state-based perception (further left 
= higher estimate); this is the point associated with high-confidence, correct “different” 
responses, with no errors. The degree of curvilinearity of the ROC provides an estimate 
of strength-based perception (more curved = higher estimate); this reflects the 





 The MTL is just one of several regions that are likely to be critical for perceptual 
judgments on complex scenes. In a previous fMRI study (Aly et al., 2014), we examined whole-
brain data to determine whether activity in different brain regions was differentially correlated 
with state- or strength-based perception. Individuals performed a task similar to that used in 
the MTL patient study, in which they viewed pairs of images and made same/different 
confidence judgments. These judgments were made using a scale that allowed individuals to 
report when state-based perception occurred, or, if it did not occur, to rate the confidence 
associated with strength-based perception. Activity in the supramarginal gyrus, posterior 
cingulate cortex, and precuneus was related to the occurrence of state-based perception, and 
was not modulated by varying confidence of strength-based perception. Activity in the fusiform 
gyrus, however, was sensitive to strength-based, but not state-based, perception. The lateral 
occipital complex showed both effects: that is, this region showed a graded increase in activity 
as confidence in strength-based perception increased, and showed an additional increase in 
activity for state-based judgments.  
 This study provides some insight into how state- and strength-based perception are 
supported by different brain regions, but, as with any fMRI study, it only indicates which regions 
are correlated with these different kinds of judgments, and does not indicate whether their 
activity is necessary for state- or strength-based perception. Thus, in the current study, we took 
a neuropsychological approach to determine which regions make necessary contributions for 
state- and strength-based perception.  
 In addition to this first exploratory aim, we also set out to test competing hypotheses 
about the role of lateral parietal cortex in state- vs. strength-based perception. The previous 
fMRI study (Aly et al., 2014) motivated the hypothesis that lateral parietal cortex — specifically, 
the supramarginal gyrus — might be critical for state- but not strength-based perception. 
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Moreover, the “global neuronal workspace” model (Dehaene et al., 2006) proposes that an 
extended parietal-frontal network is critically involved in the threshold for conscious access; 
that is, this network shows a neural ‘ignition’ that is related to conscious awareness of specific 
visual information. Insofar as state-based perception reflects a discrete signal indicating 
conscious awareness of detailed visual information, this would suggest a role for parietal 
regions in state-based perception (also see Lamme, 2003). 
 There are, however, reasons to predict that parietal cortex might be critical for 
strength-based perception. Our prior patient study implicated the hippocampus (and more 
generally, the MTL) in strength-based perception (Aly et al., 2013; also see Elfman, Aly, & 
Yonelinas, in press). Due to the anatomical and functional connectivity between the 
hippocampus/MTL and parietal cortex (e.g., Kahn et al., 2008; Kravitz et al., 2011; Libby et al., 
2012; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012), one prediction is that patients with damage that includes 
parietal regions will show impairments in strength-based perception. Additionally, our findings 
relating strength-based perception to graded changes in confidence (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012) are 
reminiscent of the graded signals in monkey LIP neurons, which reflect continuous integration 
of sensory evidence in the service of perceptual decision-making (e.g., Shadlen & Newsome, 
2001; Mazurek et al., 2003; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Bollimunta et al., 2012). Although at different 
levels of analysis and different timescales, this parallel suggests that neural signals in parietal 
cortex may be related to perceptual judgments based on signals that vary in strength (for 
related fMRI work in humans, see Heekeren et al., 2006; Ploran et al., 2007; Kayser et al., 2010; 
Liu & Pleskac, 2011; Ploran et al., 2011).  
 Thus, our aims were twofold: (1) to explore which regions in the brain (outside of the 
MTL) are necessary for state-based and strength-based perception, and (2) to test competing 
hypotheses about the role of lateral parietal cortex in state- vs. strength-based perception. In 
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order to examine these issues, we tested perceptual judgments in eleven stroke patients with 
right hemisphere lesions, which — considered as a group — included parietal, occipital, and 
temporal cortical regions, insula, thalamus, basal ganglia, and white matter in the vicinity of 
these cortical and subcortical structures (Figure 2). Inclusion of patients with damage in 
heterogenous regions allowed us to investigate the contributions of distinct brain areas to 
state- and strength-based perception, in addition to examining the specific hypotheses about 
the role of parietal cortex. Such an approach offers an important advance over our previous 
patient study, in which we only tested individuals with damage to the medial temporal lobe (Aly 
et al., 2013). We focus on right hemisphere structures because previous work has indicated that 
the right, more than the left, hemisphere plays a necessary role in visuospatial perception and 
attention (Mesulam, 1981). 
 We used a perceptual change detection task in which patients and healthy controls 
viewed pairs of scenes, presented sequentially, and indicated their confidence that the two 
were the same or different (Figure 3). Differences consisted of a relational manipulation that 
slightly contracted or expanded the scenes relative to one another, changing the distances 
between component parts without adding or removing any particular object. Confidence 
ratings were used to plot ROCs and estimate the contributions of state- and strength-based 
perception.  
 In addition to the main behavioral analyses in which we examined state- and strength-
based perception in the entire patient group, we conducted follow-up analyses in order to 
determine the roles of different right hemisphere regions in state- and strength-based 
perception. Specifically, we examined lesion overlap images for subgroups of patients 
depending on their behavioral performance. Such an analysis enabled us to test whether 
parietal cortical regions played a unique role in state- vs. strength-based perception: if this is 
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indeed the case, patients who do not have damage in the parietal cortex should perform 
differently from those who do. Thus, we felt that this analysis would be useful in providing 
further insights into the neural correlates of state- and strength-based perception, and would 
be important in guiding future studies. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
 The study was approved by the University of Liège Psychology ethics review board. All 
patients and healthy control participants gave their written informed consent prior to their 
inclusion in this study. 
 The patient group consisted of eleven patients with right hemisphere damage as a 
result of stroke. Patients were recruited at Centre Neurologique et de Réadaptation 
Fonctionnelle Fraiture, Hôpital Sainte-Ode, and University hospitals from Liège and Brussels in 
Belgium. All patients but one were in-patients. Exclusion criteria were bilateral lesions, 
evidence of previous neurological diseases, or psychiatric disorders. 
  Demographic information and the neuropsychological profiles of the patients are 
shown in Table 1. All but one patient showed symptoms of unilateral spatial neglect, as 
frequently observed after right-hemisphere stroke (see Karnath & Rorden, 2012). Neglect was 
assessed with the Batterie d’Evaluation de la Négligence unilatérale (BEN; Azouvi et al. 2002) 
and the line cancellation task (Albert, 1973).  Patients were considered to have neglect if they 
had poor performance (i.e., errors or response times outside of the cut-off ranges; see Albert, 
1973; Azouvi et al. 2002) in one or more of these clinical tests assessing spatial attention. As an 
indicator of neglect severity, the proportion of spatial attention tests on which each patient was 
impaired, and the proportion of scores that were impaired, are shown in Table 1. Most patients 
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completed all nine tests of spatial neglect (16 scores in total); two completed eight tests, and 
one patient completed seven tests.  
CT or MRI scans were available for each of the eleven patients. For each patient, MRI or 
CT scans were first spatially normalized to MNI space using a specific MR or CT template 
optimized for individuals with ages similar to what is commonly seen in stroke, using the 
Clinical Toolbox in SPM8 (Rorden et al., 2012). This was done using SPM8 normalization 
routines with lesion cost function masking (Brett et al., 2001) in order to ensure that non-linear 
spatial transformations did not shrink the size of the brain lesion or distort the local healthy 
tissue. Next, areas of lesion were manually traced on the normalized structural image of the 
brain using PMOD software (http://www.pmod.com/technologies/index.html). Lesion overlap is 
shown in Figure 2, and lesion descriptions for each patient are in Table 2. Maximal lesion 
overlap sites (determined using the MNI structural atlas and the Juelich Histological Atlas; 
Eickhoff et al., 2005) included the inferior parietal lobule (PFm), thalamus, superior longitudinal 
fasciculus (underlying the inferior parietal lobule), and corticospinal tract (adjacent to the 
thalamus and putamen). 
 Twenty-four healthy control participants took part in the study. They were 
community-dwelling, were recruited by word of mouth and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Control participants had no cognitive or psychiatric problems, were free of medication 
that could affect cognitive functioning, and reported being in good health. All controls had 
normal scores on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) and the Mattis Dementia Rating 
Scale.  
 Patients and controls did not differ in age [Patients: M = 67.2 years, SD = 9.1; Controls: 
M = 69.7 years, SD = 6.7; t(33) = 0.91, p = .37; 95% CI of difference in means: -8.04 to 3.08] or 
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education [Patients: M = 10.6 years, SD = 3.1; Controls: M = 12.9 years, SD = 3.3; t(33) = 1.93, p = 
.06; 95% CI of difference in means: -4.69 to 0.13].  
 
 
Figure 2. Lesion overlap for all patients. The regions of greatest overlap were the 
inferior parietal lobule (PFm), thalamus, superior longitudinal fasciculus (underlying the 
inferior parietal lobule), and corticospinal tract (adjacent to the thalamus and 
putamen). x, y, and z coordinates are in MNI space. 
 
 
Materials, Design, and Procedure 
 The stimuli and task were adapted from Aly & Yonelinas (2012), Experiment 2A. The 
experimental stimuli were one hundred and sixty colored photographs of buildings. An 
additional set of building images were used for practice trials. Two altered versions of each 
image were created in Adobe Photoshop. The first version was expanded outward slightly 
(using the “spherize” option, set at 15%); the second version was contracted inward slightly 
(using the “pinch” option, set at 15%). The 15% value was chosen based on pilot studies for the 
first series of behavioral experiments on state- and strength-based perception (Aly & Yonelinas, 
2012). Those pilot studies were conducted to find the levels of distortion that avoided both 
floor and ceiling effects in terms of overall performance (measured as d’). Those levels of 
distortion were used in the current study. 
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 These kinds of distortions keep the sizes of the images the same, but alter the global 
or relational information within the scenes (i.e., the relative distances of component parts) 
without adding or removing specific objects. Additionally, this manipulation leads to the largest 
changes at the center of the images, and gradually decreasing changes toward the periphery; 
the edges of the images are largely unaffected. This distortion does not manipulate the 
boundaries of the images, which may introduce confounds given the boundary extension 
phenomenon (in which individuals perceive or remember the boundaries of an image as 
extending further than they actually do; Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; 
also see Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012, for a relevant patient finding). Thus, if the boundary 





Figure 3. Scene perception task. On each trial, participants viewed a pair of 
sequentially presented scenes, with a dynamic noise mask between them. They then 
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made same/different judgments using a confidence scale [shown as presented to 
participants, in French. English translation (top to bottom): sure different, maybe 
different, guess different, guess same, maybe same, sure same]. There was no time 
limit for the response. This example is of a “different” trial: the first scene is expanded 
outward slightly and the second is contracted inward slightly. These changes alter the 
distances between components of the scene without adding or removing any objects. 
 
 
 The task consisted of four practice trials and one hundred and sixty experimental trials. 
Half of the trials were “same” trials, in which identical images were presented (i.e. the two 
pinched or the two spherized versions of a particular scene, with these trial types occurring 
equally often). The remaining half were “different” trials, in which the two altered versions of a 
scene were presented (i.e., the pinched version followed by the spherized version or vice versa; 
these trials occurred equally often). Pinched and spherized stimuli occurred equally often as the 
first and second images across trials. Two stimulus lists were created so that each scene was 
tested on both “same” and “different” trials across participants. “Same” and “different” trials 
were presented in a random order. 
Patients were tested individually in an examination room at the hospital where they 
were in-patients, except for one patient who was tested at home. Control participants were 
assessed individually in a quiet room at home. All participants were native French speakers. 
Participants were told that they would be presented with pairs of very similar images, and they 
had to judge if the two images were the same or different.  
The visual angle for presented stimuli was 3° to 5° at central vision, and participants sat 
50 cm from the computer screen. On each trial, they viewed a red fixation cross for 1500 ms. 
This was followed by a scene for 1500 ms, a dynamic noise mask for 50 ms, and, finally, the 
corresponding identical (on “same” trials) or alternate (on “different” trials) version of the scene 
(Figure 3). Participants then used a 6-point confidence scale (presented in French) to indicate 
how sure they were that the two scenes were the same or different. The confidence scale was 
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presented vertically on the right hand side of the screen, to reduce the likelihood that patients 
would neglect half of the scale. Only verbal labels were provided (i.e., not numbers), to avoid 
potential distortion of a mental number line in the patients (Zorzi et al., 2002), which could 
affect the use of the confidence scale. Patients and controls verbally indicated their confidence 
response, which was entered by the experimenter. The second image and the scale stayed on 
the screen until a response was made; there was no time limit. 
Before the experiment, participants were familiarized with the kinds of images and 
perceptual changes in the experiment. They viewed four pairs of images. Each pair consisted of 
a pinched and a spherized version of a scene. Participants examined the images to observe the 
differences between pairs, so that they would know the types of changes to expect in the 
experiment. Participants also completed four practice trials, with the same timing as the 
experimental trials, before beginning the actual experiment.  
 
Results 
 Performance was examined by plotting confidence-based ROC curves. The leftmost 
point on the ROC is the probability of a hit (y-axis) and false alarm (x-axis) for the most 
confident “same” response, and subsequent points are the cumulative probabilities for hits and 
false alarms as responses of decreasing confidence are added. Parameter estimates of state- 
and strength-based perception are obtained using maximum likelihood estimation to find the 
curve that best fits the observed ROC points (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012; Aly et al., 2013, 2014; also 
see Yonelinas, 1994). This is done by varying the values of different parameters to find the ROC 
function that yields the highest log-likelihood. The parameters varied are: the criterion points, 
the upper x-intercept, and the curvilinearity of the ROC. The upper x-intercept of the fitted ROC 
provides an estimate of the probability of state-based perception (higher estimates for 
intercepts that are shifted further to the left). The curvilinearity of the ROC reflects the 
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discriminability afforded by strength-based perception (i.e., the difference between the 
strength distributions for “same” and “different” trials, in units of standard deviations). 
 Our first analyses treated the patients as a single group, albeit with the knowledge 
that there might be substantial variability across participants. First, we examined a standard 
measure of overall discriminability (d’), without respect to the distinction between state- and 
strength-based perception. To this end, all responses associated with a “same” judgment (i.e., 
sure, maybe, and guess same) were collapsed into a single “same” response, and all responses 
associated with a “different” judgment (i.e., sure, maybe, and guess different) were collapsed 
into a single “different” response.  d’  was then calculated based on the proportion of hits 
(“same” responses when the images were the same) and false alarms (“same” responses when 
the images were different). Patients were significantly impaired relative to controls on this 
measure of overall discriminability [Patients: M = 0.25, SD = 0.43; Controls: M = 1.01, SD = 0.45; 
t(33) = 4.68, p = .00005; 95% CI of difference in means: -1.09 to -0.43]. We next sought to 
determine whether this impairment in overall performance arose from a reduction in state-




Figure 4. State- and strength-based perception in patients and controls. (A) 
Aggregate ROCs for patients and controls on the scene perception task. The upper x-
intercept reflects the probability of state-based perception, while the degree of 
curvilinearity provides an estimate of strength-based perception. The patient 
aggregate ROC was relatively linear, indicative of an impairment in strength-based 
perception, and also showed evidence of a reduction in state-based perception (upper-x 
intercept is shifted further to the right). (B) Average parameter estimates of state- and 
strength-based perception from individual ROC fits. Data for individual patients are 
shown overlaid on the patient mean. Patients showed significant impairments of 
strength-based perception, with all patients performing well below the control mean. In 
contrast, the overall patient group was not significantly impaired on state-based 
perception. State- and strength-based perception have different units (probability and 
d’, respectively), so their parameter estimates are not directly comparable. Error bars 
depict ±1 SEM. *** = p < .001. 
 
 Visual inspection of the aggregate ROCs for patients and controls (Figure 4A) reveals 
that the patients’ ROC is lower overall compared to that of controls, indicating a reduction in 
overall performance. Moreover, the patient ROC is relatively linear, in contrast to the 
curvilinear ROC of the controls; this is suggestive of an impairment in strength-based 
perception. Finally, the upper x-intercept of the patients’ ROC is slightly reduced (shifted to the 
right) compared to that of controls, suggestive of a small reduction in state-based perception.  
These observations from the aggregate ROCs were confirmed by the average estimates of 
state- and strength-based perception from individual-participant ROCs (Figure 4B).  Strength-
based perception was significantly impaired in the patients, with a nearly 85% reduction 
relative to controls [Patients: M  = 0.09, SD  = 0.10; Controls: M = 0.53; SD = .30; t(33) = 4.71, p = 
.00004; 95% CI of difference in means: -0.62 to -0.25]. In contrast, state-based perception was 
numerically, but not significantly, lower in the patients compared to controls [Patients: M = 
0.18, SD = 0.15; Controls: M  = 0.29, SD = 0.21; t(33) = 1.54, p = .13; 95% CI of difference in 
means: -0.25 to 0.04].  
 As performance nears the chance diagonal, ROCs will necessarily become more linear. 
To ensure that the large reduction in strength-based perception was not an artifact of lower 
performance, we compared patients and controls while matching overall performance in the 
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two groups. In order to do this, we compared the highest-performing patients with the lowest-
performing controls. From a median split on the basis of overall discriminability (measured with 
d’), we took the 12 lowest-performing controls (out of 24 total) and the 6 highest-performing 
patients (out of 11 total).  These groups were not different in overall d’ [Patients: M = 0.56, SD = 
0.05; Controls: M = 0.62, SD = 0.20; t(16) = 0.73, p = .47; 95% CI of difference in means: -0.24 to 
0.12].  
 Having matched overall performance, we examined state- and strength-based 
perception for group differences (Figure 5). The ROCs for the two groups overlapped but 
crossed over, with a greater x-intercept for the patients’ ROC, but increased curvilinearity for 
the controls’ ROC (Figure 5A). This pattern suggests a double dissociation in state- and 
strength-based perception across groups, and this double dissociation was confirmed in the 
average parameter estimates: patients had significantly higher estimates of state-based 
perception [Patients: M = 0.26, SD = .10; Controls: M = 0.13, SD = 0.13; t(16) = 2.12, p = .05; 95% 
CI of difference in means: 0.0 to 0.26], but significantly lower estimates of strength-based 
perception [Patients: M = 0.15, SD = 0.09; Controls: M = 0.41, SD = 0.25; t(16) = 2.39, p = .03; 
95% CI of difference in means: -0.47 to -0.03]. This analysis with matched performance 
suggests that the impairment in strength-based perception for patients is not an artifact of 
lower overall performance; if it were, then matching performance would have eliminated all 
differences between the patients and controls. The cross-over pattern in the ROCs, however, 
suggests that there is a difference in the perceptual processes underlying performance in the 
patients versus controls.  
 It is important to note that the preceding analysis does not suggest that right 
hemisphere damage improves state-based perception. Patients did not perform better than 
controls on state-based judgments in general (as seen in Figure 4, there was a numerical 
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decrease in state-based perception relative to the controls); the increase in state-based 
perception when matching for performance reflects differential use of perceptual signals in the 




Figure 5. State- and strength-based perception in patients and controls after 
matching for overall performance. (A) Aggregate ROCs overlapped but crossed over, 
suggesting a double dissociation in state- and strength-based perception. (B) Average 
parameter estimates of state- and strength-based perception from individual ROCs 
confirmed the double dissociation. Data for individual patients are shown overlaid on 
the patient mean. State- and strength-based perception have different units 
(probability and d’, respectively), so their parameter estimates are not directly 
comparable. Error bars depict ±1 SEM. * = p < .05. 
  
 Thus, as a group, patients showed a significant impairment in strength-based 
perception, and not state-based perception. But the preceding analyses have overlooked the 
substantial individual differences in the patient group. An examination of the individual data 
points for the patients (Figure 4B) shows that all patients had estimates of strength-based 
perception well below the control mean, but this was not the case for state-based perception.  
Rather, half of the patients were clustered above or around the control mean, while the other 
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half showed evidence of impairment. To investigate this further, we divided the patients into 
two groups on the basis of estimates of state-based perception, such that the five patients who 
were closest to the control mean formed one group, and the remaining six patients, who were 
further away from the control mean, formed the other.  In the former group, the estimate of 
state-based perception was M = 0.32 (SD = 0.08; compare to mean of controls = 0.29), while in 
the latter group, this estimate was M = 0.07 (SD = 0.07). 
 We then examined the lesions and neuropsychological profiles of these two subgroups 
separately. This comparison revealed that the patients who were relatively impaired in state-
based perception (as well as impaired in strength-based perception) had regions of lesion 
overlap at the thalamus, putamen, and white matter adjacent to those structures (Figure 6). In 
contrast, the patients who had relatively spared state-based perception (but impaired strength-
based perception) showed relative sparing of the thalamus and putamen, but had regions of 
lesion overlap at the inferior parietal lobule, anterior intraparietal sulcus, and insula (Figure 7). 
Although there was generally little overlap in this latter group’s lesion locations (for all regions 
of maximal overlap, this overlap was for only two of five patients), the lesions in this group 
tended to be cortical rather than subcortical, and primarily in temporal or parietal regions.  
 We next directly compared the lesions of these patient subgroups by subtracting them 
from one another. Figure 8 shows the regions that are more often damaged in patients with 
deficits in both state- and strength-based perception (vs. those with only strength-based 
impairments); these regions include the putamen, thalamus, and adjacent white matter. Figure 
9 shows the regions that are more often damaged in patients with deficits in only strength-
based perception (vs. those with both state- and strength-based impairments); these regions 




Figure 6. Lesion overlap for the six patients who were impaired in state-based and 
strength-based perception. All six patients had damage at the corticospinal tract and 
thalamus. Additionally, five of the six patients had damage at the putamen and 
superior longitudinal fasciculus (adjacent to the inferior parietal lobule). x, y, and z 







Figure 7. Lesion overlap for the five patients who were impaired in strength-based 
perception but relatively spared in state-based perception. The regions of maximal 
overlap were the inferior parietal lobule (PFcm, PF, PFm, PGa, PGp), optic radiation, 
premotor cortex, anterior intraparietal sulcus (hlP1, hlP3), and insula. In all of these 
cases, the overlap was for two of five patients. The thalamus and putamen were 





Figure 8. Regions that are more often damaged in patients with deficits in both 
state- and strength-based perception (vs. those with just strength-based 
impairments). This image was obtained by subtracting the lesions of patients with 
selective strength-based deficits from the lesions of those impaired in both state- and 
strength-based perception. These regions include the putamen, thalamus, and 










Figure 9. Regions that are more often damaged in patients with selective deficits in 
strength-based perception (vs. those with both state- and strength-based 
impairments). This image was obtained by subtracting the lesions of patients with 
state- and strength-based deficits from the lesions of those with selective strength-









 The difference between these subgroups was specifically related to state-based 
perception (i.e., the basis for their division) — there was no difference between these 
subgroups in estimates of strength-based perception [Mann-Whitney U = 9.5, p  = 0.35 n1 = 6, n2 
= 5]. Moreover, there was no difference in the proportion of tests of spatial neglect at which 
they were impaired [U = 12, p = .65] or the proportion of scores on spatial neglect assessments 
that were associated with impairment [U = 10, p = .43].  Examining specific tests of neglect [i.e., 
overlapping figures, Bell cancellation, letter A cancellation, line cancellation, line bisection (5 
and 20 cm lines), and text reading] revealed no differences between these subgroups in the 
number of left minus right misses or amount of deviation on line bisection [all ps > 0.42 using 
the Mann-Whitney U test]. Finally, the subgroups were not different in age [U = 12.5, p = .71], 
education [U = 5, p = .07], time since stroke [U = 15, p = 1], or lesion volume [U = 9, p = .33].  
 Thus, the difference between patient subgroups in state-based perception does not 
seem to be a result of differences in severity of neglect, types of neglect tests on which 
performance is impaired, time since stroke, overall lesion size, or demographic factors. Instead, 
differences in state-based perceptual impairments in the two subgroups identified here are 
likely related to damage versus sparing of subcortical structures (namely, thalamus and 
putamen, as well as the adjacent white matter). Thus, damage to the thalamus, putamen, and 
adjacent white matter impairs both state- and strength-based perception, while damage 
primarily focused at temporo-parietal cortical regions selectively impairs strength-based 
perception. 
Discussion 
 Perceptual judgments can be based on different kinds of information (Fernandez-
Duque & Thornton, 2000; Rensink, 2000, 2004; Dehaene et al., 2006; Galpin et al., 2008; Busch 
et al., 2009, 2010; Aly & Yonelinas, 2012; Howe & Webb, 2014).  A useful distinction is between 
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state-based judgments in which individuals have conscious access to specific, detailed 
information, and strength-based judgments, which are based on a graded sense of overall 
match/mismatch (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012). We tested a group of patients with heterogeneous 
lesions following right-hemisphere stroke, and found that the patient group considered as a 
whole was impaired in strength-based, but not state-based, perception. The deficit in strength-
based perception was not an artifact of lower overall performance of the patients relative to 
controls, because matching control and patient performance revealed a double dissociation: 
patients showed increased reliance on state-based perception but impaired strength-based 
perception relative to controls.  
 There were, however, substantial individual differences in behavioral performance in 
the patient group, which were masked by analyses of the group mean. An examination of lesion 
overlap images showed that patients with spared state-based perception but reduced strength-
based perception had damage that was primarily focused around temporo-parietal cortical 
regions. In contrast, patients who showed evidence of impaired state- and strength-based 
perception had subcortical damage including the thalamus, putamen, and adjacent white 
matter. Importantly, these groups were not different in age, education, time since stroke, 
lesion volume, or the severity of spatial neglect symptoms. Thus, subcortical lesions that 
encroach on the thalamus and putamen are associated with impairments in both state- and 
strength-based perception, while temporo-parietal cortical lesions that spare subcortical 
structures are associated with selective deficits in strength-based perception. 
 It is important to note that temporo-parietal damage is sufficient, but not necessary, 
for strength-based perceptual impairments: patients with thalamic and/or basal ganglia 
damage and spared temporo-parietal cortical areas also showed deficits in strength-based 
perception (in addition to impaired state-based perception). Thus, temporo-parietal regions are 
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just one of several regions whose damage can result in impaired strength-based perception 
(also see Aly et al., 2013). 
 In previous behavioral work (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012), we found that state-based 
perception played a larger role in tasks involving detection of discrete object changes (e.g., a 
tree that is present in one scene but absent in another), was associated with a rapid temporal 
onset, and was accompanied by conscious awareness of specific details that had changed. In 
contrast, strength-based perception played a larger role in tasks involving detection of 
relational or global changes (i.e., the changes used in the current study), was associated with 
graded changes in confidence over time, and was accompanied by a sense of something having 
changed without awareness of what the specific change was (also see Rensink, 2000, 2004). 
Below, we (1) discuss the findings of the current study with respect to prior studies of state- and 
strength-based perception, (2) consider how patients’ spatial neglect symptoms may have 
contributed to the observed deficits, and, finally, (3) speculate about the specific roles of 
temporo-parietal and subcortical structures in these kinds of visual change detection.  
 
Relation to prior studies of state- and strength-based perception 
 In a previous study, we examined state- and strength-based perception in patients 
with selective lesions of the hippocampus or more extensive unilateral medial temporal lobe 
lesions that included the hippocampus and the surrounding cortex (Aly et al., 2013). We found 
that these patients showed selective deficits in strength-based perception. In the current study, 
patients with damage around temporo-parietal cortical regions showed this same pattern of 
results (i.e., impaired strength-based perception but intact state-based perception). This 
similarity in performance across patient groups with distinct lesion sites may be related to the 
anatomical and functional connectivity between the hippocampus/medial temporal lobe and 
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parietal cortex (e.g., Kahn et al., 2008; Kravitz et al., 2011; Libby et al., 2012; Ranganath & 
Ritchey, 2012). That is, these regions may be part of a network that is important for, among 
other functions, representations of complex scenes or contexts (Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012), 
and damage to any part of this network may result in similar behavioral deficits. Importantly, 
however, the same behavioral deficit might arise from different underlying impairments: e.g., 
an impaired ability to form or maintain precise relational representations (following damage to 
the hippocampus) or an impaired ability to continuously integrate or accumulate sensory 
information over time or across saccades (following damage to parietal regions). 
 Interestingly, in an fMRI study with healthy adults (Aly et al., 2014), activity in the 
supramarginal gyrus, bilaterally, was increased for state-based perception and was not 
modulated by varying levels of strength-based perception. While this pattern of results 
suggested that this region in the lateral parietal cortex might be necessary for state-based 
perception, the current results are not consistent with that view. Rather, damage including (and 
in the vicinity of) the supramarginal gyrus impaired strength-based but not state-based 
perception. A potential caveat is that we did not have patients with selective and complete 
damage to the supramarginal gyrus; testing patients with more selective lesions within parietal 
cortex will be necessary to make more specific claims about the roles of parietal subregions.  
 Finally, our previous (Aly et al., 2013) and current findings show an interesting 
relationship to work done in similar patient populations in the domain of recognition memory. 
Recognition memory performance can be separated into the contributions of state-based 
memory (high-confidence recollection of specific details) or strength-based memory 
(assessments of the strength of familiarity; see Yonelinas, 2002). Patients with focal 
hippocampal lesions show selective deficits in state-based memory (i.e., recollection; see 
Yonelinas et al., 2010 for review) and strength-based perception (Aly et al., 2013). Interestingly, 
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a recent study found that patients with damage including the lateral parietal cortex and intra-
parietal sulcus made fewer high-confidence memory judgments than controls (Hower, Wixted, 
Berryhill, & Olson, 2014); such a pattern may suggest an impairment in state-based memory. In 
the current study, patients with similar lesion locations showed impairments in strength-based 
perception. Thus, hippocampal and parietal damage lead to selective impairments in state-
based memory but strength-based perception (for related work, see Elfman et al., in press). As 
mentioned above, this similarity in performance across patient groups with different sites of 
damage may be related to the connectivity between the hippocampus and parietal cortex (e.g., 
Kahn et al., 2008; Kravitz et al., 2011; Libby et al., 2012; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012). 
 
Spatial neglect and impairments in state- or strength-based perception 
 The task used in this study was designed as a test of high-level scene perception, but 
perceptual judgments depend on the ability to attend to task-relevant information. Thus, 
reduced task performance could be related to impairments in “perception” or “attention”, 
though it would be difficult or impossible to disentangle these cognitive processes in the 
current task.  Because ten of the eleven patients tested showed symptoms of unilateral spatial 
neglect on neuropsychological tests (as commonly observed after damage to right-hemisphere 
temporo-parietal cortex, thalamus, or basal ganglia; for review, see Mesulam, 1999; Halligan et 
al., 2003; Husain & Rorden, 2003; Corbetta & Shulman, 2011; Karnath & Rorden, 2012), it is 
important to consider how their pattern of performance on the scene perception task can be 
informed by the kinds of deficits observed in this population of patients.        
 In the current study, stimuli were presented sequentially (rather than simultaneously 
on the left and right hand sides of the screen; c.f. Aly et al., 2013) to avoid neglect of one image 
in each pair; moreover, the scale was presented vertically on the right-hand side of the screen 
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and without any numerical labels, in an attempt to prevent neglect or distortion of half of the 
scale or a corresponding mental number line (Zorzi et al., 2002). While these task manipulations 
minimized any potential impairment as a result of neglect of the left side of (body-centered) 
space, such spatial attentional deficits may have still contributed to performance. For example, 
if neglect was based on image-centered coordinates (see Mesulam, 1999; also see Bisiach & 
Luzzatti, 1978), then half of each scene might have been unattended.  Detection of relational 
changes (which can be the basis for strength-based decisions) might have therefore been more 
difficult, because this relies on a representation of how component parts of the overall scene 
are related to one another. In contrast, detection of relatively local differences (which can be 
the basis for state-based decisions) may be less impaired, because such judgments could be 
made on the basis of features in the attended right half of each image. This is especially true for 
the perceptual manipulations used in the current study, because differences, when present, 
were in both left and right halves of each image. Thus, this is one way in which strength-based 
perception might be impaired more than state-based perception in patients with unilateral 
spatial neglect.  
 Alternatively, the deficits observed might be related to aspects of attention other than 
the lateralized deficits, including sustained attention, selective attention, and salience 
detection — all of which can be impaired in patients with spatial neglect (Husain & Rorden, 
2003), and all of which are likely important in the current task. Sustained and selective attention 
are important to maintain focus over the course of many trials and attend to the task-relevant 
scene information; salience detection is necessary for noticing differences between scenes that 
are largely identical, and learning to attend to parts of the scene that are more diagnostic for 
change detection (i.e., the center rather than the edges). Difficulties in any of these aspects of 
attention would be expected to affect both state- and strength-based responses, however, 
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rather than just one or the other. Thus, such attentional deficits are unlikely to explain the 
performance of patients who showed selective impairments in strength-based perception (i.e., 
those patients with primarily temporo-parietal cortical lesions), but may have contributed to 
the performance of those who showed impairments in both state- and strength-based 
perception (i.e., those patients with subcortical lesions).  
 
Parietal cortex, spatial representations, and accumulation of sensory evidence 
 The parietal cortex has been implicated in various aspects of spatial processing, 
including spatial attention and perception (Mesulam, 1999; Halligan et al., 2003; de Schotten et 
al., 2005; Verdon et al., 2010; Kravitz et al., 2011; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012; Vandenberghe et 
al., 2012). Parietal regions may therefore be important for strength-based perception because 
this kind of perception depends more on relational or spatial representations than state-based 
perception, which can be based on identification of local or item-level details (Aly & Yonelinas, 
2012).  
 The inferior parietal lobule plays an important role in maintaining stable 
representations of space across saccades (see Husain & Rorden, 2003; Verdon et al., 2010). 
Strength-based perceptual judgments may place a large demand on the ability to maintain 
such a stable spatial representation because judgments of relational match/mismatch would 
benefit from knowledge of where scene components are relative to one another. In contrast, 
state-based judgments can be made on the basis of identifying relatively local differences (Aly 
& Yonelinas, 2012), and, as such, need not depend as much on maintaining a stable spatial 
representation across saccades. This is particularly important in the context of the current study 
because participants were free to move their eyes, and had enough time to make several 
saccades over each image. Thus, the contribution of the parietal cortex to strength-based 
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perception may be related to its role in maintaining stable spatial representations of the 
environment.  
 In a previous study, we found that strength-based perception was associated with 
graded evidence accumulation; that is, in a task that depended largely on strength-based 
perception, individuals gradually increased their confidence in a same/different judgment over 
time. Furthermore, these graded changes in confidence were correlated with estimates of 
strength-based perception from an ROC analysis (Aly & Yonelinas, 2012). Neural activity in the 
lateral intraparietal area has been studied extensively in the context of perceptual decision-
making tasks, and activity in these neurons has been related to continuously-graded 
integration of sensory evidence (e.g., Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Bollimunta et al., 2012; see 
Gold & Shadlen, 2007) as well as the degree of confidence in perceptual decisions (Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009). In humans, BOLD activity in the parietal cortex — specifically, the intraparietal 
sulcus and inferior parietal lobule — has similarly been related to accumulation of sensory 
evidence in the service of perceptual decision-making (e.g., Heekeren et al., 2006; Ploran et al., 
2007; Kayser et al., 2010; Liu & Pleskac, 2011; Ploran et al., 2011). Although on markedly 
different timescales and levels of analysis, these behavioral and neural results raise the 
possibility that graded signals in parietal areas may be related to graded levels of strength-
based perception. The current finding that damage to the intraparietal sulcus and inferior 
parietal lobule is associated with a deficit in strength-based perception lends support to this 
idea, and future studies investigating the relationship between graded evidence accumulation 
and strength-based perception will be important. 
 
Thalamic and basal ganglia contributions to attention and perceptual awareness 
 32 
 Patients with damage that included the thalamus and/or the putamen showed 
impairments in both state- and strength-based judgments, raising the possibility that these 
subcortical structures play a role in high-level perceptual processing more generally. A potential 
caveat is that, of the six patients with reduced state- and strength-based perception, three also 
had damage in cortical areas, with the region of maximal overlap in the cortex being the inferior 
parietal lobule. Nevertheless, the remaining three patients had lesions confined to the vicinity 
of the thalamus, putamen, and adjacent white matter, and these patients performed just as 
poorly as the ones with more extensive damage that included the cortex. Thus, it seems from 
these data that damage to the thalamus and/or putamen is sufficient to impair both state- and 
strength-based perception. Moreover, these data show that damage to temporo-parietal 
cortical areas is also sufficient, but not necessary, for strength-based impairments (also see Aly 
et al., 2013). 
 The thalamus is often referred to as the “gateway” to the cortex, because information 
from nearly all senses (except olfaction) has to pass through the thalamus on the way to 
primary sensory cortices. Thalamic lesions may therefore disrupt the integrity of visual 
information relayed to the cortex and, as a result, impair high-level perception. The thalamus is 
also critical for states of vigilance as well as various aspects of visuospatial attention, and 
activity in the thalamus is modulated by attention (e.g., Crick, 1984; Rafal & Posner, 1987; 
Guillery et al., 1998; Dehaene et al., 2006; McAlonan et al., 2008; Saalmann & Kastner, 2009). 
Moreover, although the basal ganglia are often studied in the context of motor learning or 
control, these structures also play an important role in visual perception (see Pribram, 1977; 
Brown et al., 1997) and attentional regulation, including shifting attention or focusing on task-
relevant information in the face of competing information (e.g., Downes et al., 1989; Sharpe, 
1990; Kermadi & Boussaoud, 1995; Ravizza & Ivry, 2001; see Brown et al., 1997). Accordingly, 
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damage to the thalamus or basal ganglia might impair visuospatial attention, selective 
attention, or high-level perceptual processing, leading to reductions in both state- and 
strength-based decisions in this task. 
 It is important to consider whether general inattentiveness could account for the 
performance of patients with thalamic damage. That is, could deficits in state- and strength-
based perception be related to a reduced level of general vigilance or arousal in this group? This 
seems unlikely, because these patients were not different from those without subcortical 
damage on several neuropsychological measures, including the proportion of spatial neglect 
tests or scores that were impaired and performance on specific tests of spatial neglect. 
Additionally, each of the patients in this group showed evidence of spared cognitive functions 
on several neuropsychological tests (see Table 1; refer to Table 2 for lesion descriptions). Thus, 
deficits in high-level perception on this task were not secondary to generally reduced attention 
or arousal. That said, an important avenue for future research is an examination of the extent of 
perceptual impairments in these patients. The current study was geared toward exploring high-
level scene perception in the context of a change detection task, but this may be just one of 
many perceptual deficits that result after right hemisphere subcortical damage. 
 
Conclusions  
 Perceptual change detection can be based on different kinds of information: conscious 
access to local, detailed information (state-based perception), or graded signals reflecting a 
sense of relational match/mismatch (strength-based perception). In the current study, we show 
that right temporo-parietal cortical regions play a critical and selective role in strength-based 
perception, while the integrity of the right thalamus, putamen, and adjacent white matter is 
necessary for intact state- and strength-based perception. This work adds to a growing body of 
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evidence that highlights the utility of separating different kinds of conscious perceptual 
experiences, which have different functional characteristics and neural underpinnings. 
Distinguishing between these kinds of perception will be critical for elucidating the 
multifaceted nature of visual experiences and their complex neural bases.   
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Patient # Etiology Time since 
stroke 
(months) 




















18-16 Ischemia 3 66 14 M 0 0 WM, 
immediate 







19-7 Ischemia 14 52 12 F 0.22 0.31 WM, EM EF 
3-10 Ischemia 2 65 12 M 0.11 0.06 WM, EM EF, verbal 
fluency 




6-3 Ischemia 0 67 16 M 0.78 0.63 WM EM, EF, 
verbal 
fluency 







4-6 Ischemia 2 77 9 M 0.67 0.56 WM EF (partly 
due to 
neglect) 
10-16 Ischemia 3 73 12 M 0.78 0.75 WM Visual EM 












Table 1. Demographic information and neuropsychological profiles for the right hemisphere stroke 
patients.  Neglect was assessed with the Batterie d’Evaluation de la Négligence unilatérale (BEN; Azouvi 
et al. 2002) and the line cancellation task (Albert, 1973).  Working memory (WM) was assessed with 
forward and backward digit span. Episodic memory (EM) was assessed with verbal list learning (RL/RI-16; 
French version of Grober & Buschke, 1987), the California Verbal Learning Test, the Wechsler Memory 
Scale III, and the Doors subtest of the Doors and People test (Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1994). 
Attention and executive function (EF) were assessed with the Trail Making Test, the Stroop task, the Test 
d’Evaluation de l’Attention (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994), the key search task of the Behavioral 
Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome, the Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000) and the 
WAIS III digit symbol task. Language was assessed with verbal, semantic, and phonemic fluency tasks, 
and a naming task. In addition, the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale was administered. Each patient 
completed several, but not all, of these tests as part of the post-stroke clinical assessment, and the 
reported pattern of spared and impaired cognitive function is based on the tests that were administered 
to each patient. Gray shading indicates patients who were impaired in both state- and strength-based 
perception, while no shading indicates patients with only strength-based impairments (refer to Results 















12-10 0.0245 thalamus, precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, calcarine gyrus, posterior hippocampus 
18-16 0.011 precuneus, superior parietal lobule, mid- and posterior cingulate cortex 
19-7 0.02 supplementary motor area, superior frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, middle and superior occipital gyrus,  
angular gyrus, precuneus, cuneus, mid cingulate cortex, caudate nucleus, thalamus, putamen, insula,  
hippocampus 
3-10 0.0003 white matter near the right insula 
7-10 0.049 caudate nucleus, globus pallidus, putamen, insula, superior temporal gyrus, amygdala, hippocampus,  
Rolandic operculum, supramarginal gyrus, postcentral gyrus; white matter in temporal areas 
6-3 0.0161 calcarine gyrus, lingual gyrus, cuneus, fusiform gyrus, inferior occipital cortex 
12-4 0.027 supplementary motor area, mid cingulate cortex, paracentral lobule, precuneus, superior parietal lobule;  
white matter in medial parietal lobe 
4-6 0.073 precentral gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, Rolandic operculum, insula, superior temporal gyrus,  
angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, putamen. 
10-16 0.1423 thalamus, putamen, caudate nucleus, insula, middle and inferior temporal gyri, temporal pole, superior 
temporal sulcus, supramarginal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus; white matter 
in temporal and parietal regions 
22-4 0.0046 putamen, thalamus, superior temporal gyrus 




Table 2. Lesion volume and description for each patient, based on CT or MRI scans. Lesions were 
restricted to the right-hemisphere. Gray shading indicates patients who were impaired in both state- and 
strength-based perception, while no shading indicates patients with only strength-based impairments 
(refer to Results and Figures 6 and 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
